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THE ETHICS OF SUICIDE*
Aquinas and the Common Law
RICHARD O'SULLIVAN

S

OME obiter dicta lately spoken by the Lord Chief Justice on the subject of suicide direct attention to the attitude of the English law
(which differs from other systems of law) on this important topic.
Suicide has always been regarded by the common law as a felony:
felo-de-se, even though, by the nature of the case, the offender escapes
temporal punishment.
The principle was reasserted in an appeal to the House of Lords in
the year 1938, when it was held, in the case of Beresford v. Royal
Insurance,1 that the personal representative of one who, having insured
his life, committed suicide while sane, was not entitled to recover the
policy money from the insurance company, as it was contrary to the
policy of the law to assist a personal representative to recover the fruits
of the crime committed by the insured person. In giving judgment,
Lord Atkin said:
... Deliberate suicide, felo de se is and always has been regarded in
English law as a crime .... Indeed, Sir John Jervis, in his first edition of
his book on the office and duties of coroners, said: "Self murder is wisely
and religiously considered by the English law as the most heinous description of felonious homicide."... By English law a survivor who had agreed
... [with the deceased] to commit suicide with him is guilty of murder:
and the attempt to commit suicide is an attempt to commit a felony and
punishable accordingly: ... 2
This decision of the House of Lords was in line with the decision of
the Common Bench in a case decided in the fourth-fifth year of Queen
Elizabeth I, which is reported in Plowden's Commentaries. It is the
*Reprinted with permission from
1
2

[1938] A. C. 586.
Id. at 599.
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famous case of Hales v. Petit,3 which arose
out of the suicide by drowning of one of
the Queen's Judges, Sir James Hales. 4 The
suicide was declared to be an offense
against Nature, against God, and against
the King:
(1) Against nature, because it is contrary to the rules of self-preservation, which
is the principle of nature, for every thing
living does by instinct of nature defend itself
from destruction, and then to destroy one's
self is contrary to nature, and a thing most
horrible,

(2) Against God, in that it is a breach
of His commandment, Thou shalt not kill;
and to kill himself by which act he kills in
presumption his own soul, is a greater offence than to kill another,
(3) Against the King, in that hereby he
has lost a subject, and.., he being the head
has lost one of his mystical members. 5
The judgment of Dyer, C. J., and his
colleagues of the Common Bench reflects
the principles enounced by St. Thomas

Aquinas in answer to the question in the
Summa: "Whether it is lawful to kill oneself?":
It is altogether unlawful to kill oneself,
for three reasons: (1) Because everything
naturally loves itself, so that everything
naturally seeks to preserve its own existence
and resists destruction as far as it can.
Suicide is therefore contrary to the inclination of our nature and to the love which
every man owes to his own self.
(2) Because the part, as part, belongs to
the whole. Each man is part of the community and so he belongs in a certain manner to the community. By taking his own
life he accordingly does an injury and an
injustice to the community.
3 1 Plow. 253,75 Eng. Rep. 387 (C.B. 1563).
4 Shakespeare was familiar with the report in

Plowden, and parodies the arguments of Counsel
in the Grave-digger Scene in Hamlet.
5 1 Plow. 253, 261, 75 Eng. Rep. 387, 400 (C.B.
1563).

(3) Life is a gift God makes to man, who
is always subject to the rule of Him who
has power over life and death. And so one
who takes his own life sins against God...
as does one who arrogates to himself the
right of judging in a matter which is outside
6
his jurisdiction.

Having in mind the known dependence
on the philosophy of Aquinas of men like

Sir John Fortescue and Christopher St.
Germain and Sir Thomas More, and, in
some sense, Sir Edward Coke, 7 it is a fair
inference that Chief Justice Dyer, and his
colleagues of the Common Bench, consciously followed the teaching of Aquinas
in this matter of suicide. The argument is
in essence identical. And the inference is
strengthened if one observes that the common law also follows the reasoning of
Aquinas in his answer to the next question
in the Summa: "Is it lawful in any case to
mutilate or maim a man?" (Utrum mutilare
aliquem membro in aliquo casu possit esse
licitum?) 8 His answer is that, since each

member is a part of the whole human body,
it exists for the sake of the whole body,
and hence it is to be treated in whatever
way the good of the whole requires. A

member which is healthy, therefore, and in
its normal state, cannot be cut off without
injury to the whole body. Yet, since the
whole man is directed to the whole community of which he is a part, it may happen that the amputation

of a member

6 SUMMA THEOLOGICA, Il-li, q. 64, art. 5.
7 See the de monarchia, and the de Laudibus of
Fortescue, and the early chapters of the Doctor
and Student of St. Germain and the testimony of
Stapleton (Hallett ed., p. 38) and the argument
for property in the Utopia and the letter of
Thomas More to Dorpius (1515), and see the
autographed copy of the Library Catalogue of
Sir Edward Coke (Yale).
8 SUMMA THEOLOGICA, I-l1, q. 65, art. 1.
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(though it be prejudicial to the body of
the individual citizen) may be directed to
the good of the whole community, if it be
inflicted as a punishment with a view to
the repression of certain crimes. And so,
just as public authority may deprive a
citizen of his life for certain gross crimes,
it has the right also to deprive him of one
of his members for certain lesser offenses.
But a private person may never take such
action, even with the consent of the victim.
To do so would be to do an injury to the
community to which the individual man in
his integrity belongs.
The principle stated in this form by
Aquinas has been restated and enforced
by the English Courts in a series of cases
in modern and even in very recent times.
Thus the consent of the victim is no answer
to a criminal charge in respect of blows
which are intended or are likely to maim
or to do serious bodily harm to the victim. 9
Again, it has been held to be beyond the
power of an individual citizen to authorize
the practice of artificial sterilization, e.g.
by an operation of double vasectomy. 10
9 See R. v. Coney, 8 Q. B. D. 534 (1882); R. v.
Donavan, [1934] 2 K.B. 498.
10 See Bravery v. Bravery, [1954] 3 All E.R. 59
(Dissenting judgment of Denning, L. J.).

The better opinion among practitioners
in the law is that the performance of such
an operation (even with the consent of the
patient) is a criminal offense on the part
of the surgeon, unless of course it is dictated by some overriding necessity.
It is beyond dispute that the common
law of England was, in the picturesque
phrase of Professor John C. Wu, "cradled
in Christianity." Pollock and Maitland told
us long ago that:
It is by "popish clergymen" that our English
common law is converted from a rude mass
of customs into an articulate system, and
when the "popish clergymen," yielding at
length to the pope's commands, no longer
sit as the principal justices of the king's
court, the creative age of our medieval law
is over. 11
Granted that the creative age of the common law, which Pollock and Maitland had
in mind, had passed before the writings of
Aquinas came to be known in England, it
is reasonably clear that during the fourteenth, fifteenth and sixteenth centuries
these writings were widely known among
the leading lawyers of the Inns of Court
and exerted an influence on the later development of the law.
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